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Coping with Trouble as a Complex Constellation of 
Political and Research Actors: Introducing a Theoretical 
Perspective
Uwe Schimank and Andreas Stucke
In this introductory chapter we will offer a theoretical frame of reference for 
all of the contributions to this book. We will do this in three respects. We 
will begin by describing the growing practical and -  somewhat neglected -  
theoretical relevance of the topic of “Coping with Trouble.” Then we will 
clarify the main variables which constitute the topic -  trouble and coping -  
and present an actor-theoretical frame of reference focussing on the aggregate 
effects of coping within complex constellations of actors. Finally, we will 
characterize the research approach guiding the organization of this book as 
a search for a “grounded theory of the middle range,” and provide a preview 
of the case studies to follow.
Thus, this introduction sets the stage for detailed empirical studies. It does 
not anticipate their findings -  we have saved that “harvest” for the conclusion. 
This chapter does, however, develop theoretical concepts which we hope will 
enable the reader to perceive familiar empirical phenomena in a new light.
1 Political and Theoretical Relevance o f the Topic
Anticipating the more detailed discussion in the following section, the kinds 
of trouble we are concerned with here are violations of certain vital interests 
of state-financed researchers or research institutes1 by political action. Many
1 We exclude industrial research from our consideration, even where it is mainly financed 
by the state. This is certainly not to deny that industrial researchers are faced with trou-
ble, too.
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contemporary examples come to mind quickly. One kind of trouble is certain-
ly the situation which John Ziman has portrayed in reference to the United 
Kingdom as “science in a ’steady state’” (Ziman 1987). The money for the 
promotion of research which had been provided quite generously by the state 
for more than two decades became increasingly scarce during the 1970s and 
1980s in many of the major Western countries. A “period of affluence” turned 
into a “period of scarcity.” Attempts to establish more rigorous evaluations 
of the quality of the research promoted institutionally or by project grants 
were typical of this phase, most visibly in Great Britain. No matter how use-
ful such evaluations may be from the point of view of the state, for the re-
searchers and institutes involved these new conditions of their resource acqui-
sition were obviously often troublesome.
Another frequent source of trouble was political demands to increase the 
societal utility of scientific research by directing it toward areas of vital con-
cern for important societal groups. Environmental problems, or the develop-
ment of technologies needed by major domestic industries suddenly had top 
priority. The trouble implied in this was aptly described under the heading 
of “science as a commodity” (Gibbons/ Wittrock 1985), which means the dan-
ger of research becoming increasingly instrumentalized for the realization of 
very narrow or even -  in the case of military research, for example -  dubious 
societal interests. The dependence of researchers and institutes upon increas-
ingly scarce resources from the state made them increasingly vulnerable to 
such pressures.
Thirdly, in some fields, research faces trouble or might be facing it soon 
because of political regulations forbidding specific scientifically promising 
research themes or methods. The most spectacular recent cases have been in 
certain subfields of genetic engineering. But the restrictions imposed upon 
empirical social research by data-protection laws, for example, also hamper 
research. Again, as with the other types of trouble, there might be -  and often 
are -  very understandable societal and political concerns motivating these 
political interventions. As private citizens wanting to protect, say, their own 
health or privacy, even the affected researchers themselves might be in favor 
of such political measures. But for the researchers’ work, they constitute 
trouble -  and it is only this fact that is of concern to us here.
Finally, there is a type of trouble which results from fundamental institu-
tional rearrangements of research institutes or even the research system as 
a whole. The ongoing transformations of the societies in Eastern Europe serve
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as a particularly dramatic illustration of comprehensive change throughout 
the system. The rapid political, economical, social, and cultural changes oc-
curring in these societies confront their research systems with entirely new 
demands and expectations. A very special subcase of this is the unification 
of Germany, because the entire society of the former German Democratic 
Republic was integrated into the totally different societal structure of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, with strong repercussions in the research sys-
tems of both the East and the West.
For all of these types of trouble -  resource scarcity, political instrumentali- 
zation, political regulation, and institutional rearrangements -  countless stories 
from the history of scientific research in different countries could be told. 
Trouble, and coping with trouble, are nothing new. What may be new about 
the current and, as may be expected, future situation is the cumulation and 
interrelation of at least the first three kinds of trouble. This estimation be-
comes plausible within a long-term view of the development of the research 
system of modem societies.
Since the Renaissance, the differentiation of scientific research as an 
autonomous societal subsystem has emphasized the character of scientific 
knowledge as an end in itself. Serving at first mainly as a legitimatory device 
to ward off interference by the church into the production of scientific knowl-
edge, it later became more useful for defending research autonomy against 
extrascientific demands from the state, the military, and industry. The greater 
the researchers’ and research institutes’ autonomy is, the greater their freedom 
is to act according to the research system’s own inherent logic of action. This 
logic demands from a scientist that he acquire a scientific reputation by con-
tributing new scientific knowledge which the respective scientific community 
evaluates as being important and true (Polanyi 1962). Admittedly, not all 
researchers follow this orientation all the time; but it is, although probably 
not the dominating orientation within the research system, without doubt the 
one which ultimately distinguishes research activities from all other kinds of 
social action. Accordingly, this orientation shapes the vital interests of most 
researchers and research institutes; it is from the conflict between this internal 
logic o f action and the research system’s dependency on external resources 
that the trouble to be discussed here originates.
For centuries, research activities were most often financed privately -  
either by the researchers themselves, if they could afford it, or by wealthy 
patrons. As long as the financial demands of research were small, these ar-
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rangements worked. In the nineteenth century, however, they began to be 
replaced by the functional combination of research with higher education at 
the universities. In this combination, the resource demands of research remain 
inconspicuous and profit to this day from the high societal legitimacy of 
teaching. Research at universities shares a common pool of resources with 
teaching, which is considered legitimate because the teaching is supposed to 
be based very directly on the results of the continually progressing research 
in the respective disciplines. But, since the mid-nineteenth century, research 
has gradually grown beyond the sheltering embrace of higher education. Out-
side of the universities, research institutes were founded which had to justify 
their resource demands in other ways. At the same time, the resources re-
quired by university research grew to such an extent -  particularly in the 
experimental sciences -  that they could no longer be acquired under the cover 
of teaching needs. Thus, the mobilization of the necessary financial resources 
became one of the major problems of state-financed scientific research -  and, 
thereby, one source of trouble to the respective researchers and research insti-
tutes.
The best way to legitimize one’s resource demands has always been to 
promise that important societal benefits will emerge from one’s research. But 
such promises are inherently ambivalent. They are undoubtedly persuasive, 
fostering within society certain expectations about future benefits. Sooner or 
later, however, such expectations have to be satisfied, at least to a certain 
extent. If they are, they may even grow; then, still more will be expected from 
an increasing range of research fields. Thus, by solving short-term problems 
of legitimizing resource demands, the long-term problem of insatiable societal 
demands for useful research is created. This is precisely what has happened 
during this century. Since the 1950s, at the latest, Western societies have been 
portrayed as science-based societies which owe their continual progress to 
an extensive scientification of an ever-wider spectrum of societal problem 
solving -  from industrial production, political decision making, and health 
care to such realms of social life as child-rearing or sexuality. This is the 
logical conclusion drawn from the cultural tradition of Western modernity, 2
2 See, among other similar concepts, Helmut Schelsky’s “scientific-technical civilization” 
(Schelsky 1961), Daniel Bell’s “post-industrial society” (Bell 1973), Rolf Kreibich’s 
“scientific society” (Kreibich 1986), orNico Stehr’s “knowledge society” (Böhme/ Stehr 
1986; Ericson/ Stehr 1992).
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which closely ties societal progress to scientific and technological progress, 
thereby stimulating an escalating use of scientific knowledge in society (Schi- 
mank 1990; 1992). Thus, Francis Bacon’s Renaissance vision of scientific 
research receiving generous financing from the state because of its beneficial 
effects on the general welfare of mankind (Krohn 1987) has finally come true 
to a remarkable extent.
This relationship between scientific research in search of truth and extra-
scientific actors demanding useful truths does not necessarily have to be 
encumbered by trouble. But it always implies the possibility of trouble. In-
deed, for researchers, impatient and often immodest demands to find solutions 
to societal problems are a disruption. Societal groups who see themselves as 
potential beneficiaries of the knowledge produced in a particular research area 
often try to instrumentalize the research process strictly for their own imme-
diate interests. The more successful such interventions are, the more narrow-
minded and short-sighted research efforts are likely to become. This poses 
trouble for researchers and research institutes because they are committed to 
the goal of attaining the best possible scientific reputation, which tends to 
be garnered by publishing broadly-based contributions furthering the long-
term advancement of the respective research area. Within academic science 
in the universities as well as in many state-financed research institutes outside 
of the universities, this curiosity-based orientation is very strong. Consequent-
ly, the relation to extrascientific interests which demand “value for money” 
often becomes a source of trouble.
Moreover, in the Baconian vision, there was no presentiment that scientific 
knowledge might become not only useful, but harmful to society as well. This 
innocent, optimistic point of view can no longer be upheld. Of course there 
were many eruptions of distrust in science before the twentieth century (Co-
hen 1980). But this distrust was temporary and often articulated by relatively 
small and ineffectual societal groups. In recent decades, however, scientific 
progress has increasingly exhibited its gloomy side to society, as warfare with 
poison gas or the atomic bomb, fatal accidents in chemical plants and atomic 
reactors, or the recent damage to the ozone layer exemplify. A science-based 
society is necessarily also a “risk society” (Beck 1986; Schimank 1990; 1992). 
Moreover, the risks of scientification have given rise to social movements 
which attack not only the ways scientific knowledge is used by certain social 
groups, but also scientific research itself as irresponsible insofar as it practi-
cally uses society as its extended laboratory for often dangerous experiments
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(Krohn/ Weyer 1990). The Chernobyl catastrophe as well as the Gulf war 
were large-scale scientific experiments, indeed (Krohn/ Weingart 1987; Weyer 
1991). Thus, protests against lax restrictions of scientific research also begin 
to cause trouble for researchers and research institutes. Again, scientific re-
search following its own logic of action oriented toward the acquisition of 
scientific reputation cannot help but perceive extrascientific restrictions of 
its choice of themes or methods as being troublesome to the extent that these 
restrictions prohibit promising work. This is especially true if researchers in 
a given research area are not all restricted to the same degree -  for instance, 
if the laws regulating genetic engineering are much stricter in one country 
than in another.
Thus, scientific research is ambivalent to society; It is useful, but it also 
harbors risks. This ambivalence results from the researchers’ and research 
institutes’ dependence on external financial resources combined with their 
dominant interest to improve their scientific reputation. Three interrelated 
trends -  increased costs of research, increased demands for its societal use 
value, and increased societal risks of the application of scientific knowledge 
-  constitute the basic sources of trouble for those researchers and research 
institutes primarily devoted to the internal logic of research. Having thus 
sketched the practical relevance of our topic, we can now consider its theoreti-
cal relevance.
Investigating how researchers and research institutes cope with political 
trouble could be an important extension of an institutionalist perspective on 
science shared by many sociologists and historians of science as well as by 
political scientists investigating science policy. This perspective, theoretically 
developed especially within the sociology of science during the 1950s and 
1960s, focusses on scientific research as a subsystem of modem society with 
its own roles and norms, its own communication and reward structure, its own 
formal organizations, and its own relations to the other subsystems of society. 
The institutionalist perspective stresses the distinctiveness of research as a 
specific type of social action -  a distinctiveness produced by these compo-
nents of the institutional order of the research system.3 4 What is especially
3 Initiated by Robert K. Merton, this perspective was best represented by Joseph Ben- 
David (Ben-David 1971; 1972; 1977: 29-193; 1991).
4 In contrast to this, the sociology of scientific knowledge which has superseded the institu-
tionalist perspective within the sociology of science since the 1970s neglects, and some-
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interesting for us are the studies using this approach which deal with struc-
tures and processes of mutual social influence between the research system 
and the political system (Price 1965; Weingart 1970; Greenberg 1971). It is 
just this interface, as seen “from below” by individual researchers or research 
organizations, which interests us when we ask how they cope with politically 
induced troubles.
But we need more than a theoretical perspective which emphasizes the 
distinctiveness of scientific research as a societal subsystem and deals with 
the manifold relationships between the research system and the political sys-
tem. Both conditions are fulfilled also by the perspective of sociological sys-
tems theory as developed by Talcott Parsons and, later, by Niklas Luhmann 
(Storer 1966; Parsons/ Platt 1973; Luhmann 1968; 1981; 1990; Stichweh 
1984; 1987; 1988). This perspective, however, denies the analytical impor-
tance of distinguishing between social entities which are able to act and social 
entities which can only shape action -  it overlooks the distinction between 
actors on the one hand and institutional structures or social systems on the 
other (Schimank 1985: 426-432). From a systems-theoretical point of view, 
the research system or the political system acts, while we conceptualize each 
of these societal subsystems as an institutional order which shapes the actions 
of the actors embedded within it -  the researchers or research institutes within 
the research system, for example, and politicians, bureaucrats, parliaments 
and ministries within the political system. Such an actor-theoretical founda-
tion of the institutionalist perspective allows us to describe and explain the 
selection and the outcomes of social action with regard to the interests, inter-
dependencies, resources, and strategies of the relevant individual and corpo-
rate actors within societal subsystems.
An interesting exception within the systems-theoretical perspective is 
Wolfgang Krohn and Günther Küppers’ understanding of scientific research
times even denies, the difference between scientific research and other kinds of social 
action (Latour/ Woolgar 1979; Latour 1987; Knorr-Cetina 1981; Knorr-Cetina/ Mulkay 
1983; Lynch 1985). This approach, inspired by relativist philosophies of science, an 
epistemological social constructivism, and sociological ethnomethodology, does point 
out important similarities between social action within laboratories or scientific controver-
sies, on the one hand, and political, economic or religious action on the other. From the 
institutionalist perspective, however, the sociology of scientific knowledge is not a theo-
retical competitor but, rather, a source of possibly useful, complementary approaches 
to analysis (Ben-David 1983; Freudenthal 1984).
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as a “self-organizing” social system (Krohn/ Küppers 1987; 1990; Küppers/ 
Krohn 1992). They explicitly deviate from the usual systems-theoretical prem-
ise and state that actors -  individual researchers and the research group -  are 
the proper basic elements for an analysis of scientific research. These actors’ 
principal aim is to ensure the continuation of their research activities. To 
achieve this, researchers and research groups engage in several kinds of activi-
ties, some of which are directed toward the political system -  such as, for 
instance, political lobbying to attain the promotion of research programs from 
the state. This analytical approach stressing the vital interests of actors within 
the research system to come to terms with actors in this system’s environment 
-  especially political actors -  is obviously a good starting point for our topic.
We would like to introduce three additional aspects which Krohn and 
Küppers have not addressed, but which we have found necessary for a thor-
ough analysis of the research system’s coping reactions to political disturb-
ances of research conditions. Firstly, Krohn and Küppers analytically disregard 
the fact that not only individual researchers and groups of researchers, but 
also research institutes and groups of research institutes -  such as, for 
instance, the Max Planck Society -  are actors within the research system. One 
of the reasons such corporate actors -  which are often quite powerful -  have 
emerged is to facilitate strategic action against potentially troublesome politi-
cal interventions into scientific research. Secondly, Krohn and Küppers offer 
no analytical tools for the analysis of interdependencies of actors and the 
aggregate effects of the interplay of many actors’ actions. Such tools for 
understanding complex constellations of actors have been developed within 
different branches of the actor-theoretical perspective -  in social-exchange 
theory, network analysis, principal-agent theory and game theory, to name 
just a few. Integrating such general analytical tools within the toolbox of an 
institutionalist perspective on scientific research seems indispensable to us. 
Thirdly, being very abstract, Krohn and Küppers’ outline disregards specific 
institutional factors within the research system and within its societal environ-
ment. For instance, whether a research institute is primarily financed by insti-
tutional grants or by project grants obviously has a strong influence on both 
the type and the intensity of resource trouble the respective political actors 
can cause the institute.
There are many empirical studies of the different facets of the relationship 
between scientific research and politics which implicitly share Krohn and 
Küppers’ general analytical orientation and also take the aspects neglected
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by them into account to a certain extent. Some work at the Max-Planck-In- 
stitut fiir Gesellschaftsforschung in Cologne in the field of the sociology of 
science has been oriented toward formulating a new institutionalist perspective 
based on the latest concepts of actor theory. This approach has been applied 
to such topics as the institutional dynamics of state-financed research institutes 
outside of the universities in West Germany (Hohn/ Schimank 1990), the 
political promotion and guidance of medical research in different Western 
countries (Braun 1991; 1992), the reaction of German research institutes and 
research politics to promising research opportunities in superconductivity 
(Jansen 1990), the differentiation and political role of the Federal Ministry 
for Research and Technology in West Germany (Stucke 1993), or the promo-
tion of cooperation between research institutes and industry as a new instru-
ment of research policy (Liitz 1993). These studies found numerous examples 
illustrating the ability and willingness of researchers and research institutes 
to take advantage of good opportunities to further their vital interests: to 
promote institutional growth, monopolize research domains, or increase their 
institute’s research autonomy. Occasionally, the investigations also came 
across situations of politically induced trouble for researchers or research 
institutes, especially in the studies about medical research and about state- 
financed research institutes outside of the universities. It is this other side of 
the coin we want to investigate more systematically now. We hope to comple-
ment the institute’s theoretical perspective with regard to an aspect which has 
gained political relevance and also promises additional theoretical insights 
into the complex relationship between actors within the research system and 
within the political system. With this, we would like to make a contribution 
to a political sociology of science.
2 Main Variables and Analytical Framework
Our topic is circumscribed by two main variables: trouble and coping. Having 
used these terms in their everyday sense in the previous section, we would 
now like to define more precisely what they mean within the framework of 
our theoretical considerations.
The basic idea is familiar from psychological studies of the reactions of 
individuals to so-called “critical life events” such as the death of a spouse,
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a chronic illness, or becoming unemployed.5 These stressful life events cause 
trouble with which the individuals somehow have to cope. Transposing this 
to our topic, we can start by stating that trouble means more than the every-
day problems which researchers or research institutes face in their interactions 
with political actors. Examples of political actors’ attempts to instrumentalize 
scientific research for their own interests, for example, are legion, as are those 
of researchers in relentless pursuit of adequate financial support for their 
institutes. But in order for these difficulties to be classified as trouble, they 
must become critical. The researchers or research institutes involved must 
perceive the problems as drastic violations of their vital interests. Thus, 
whether an event is categorized as a source of trouble for an actor depends 
in the final analysis upon his aspiration level with regard to his relevant inter-
ests. For example, if a research institute has no ambition to select its research 
topics autonomously, perhaps because the institute’s corporate identity empha-
sizes a research mission of supporting public policy-making, even strong 
political interventions into the setting of the research agenda will not be expe-
rienced as trouble, but as “business as usual.”
However, although the criterion for classifying something as being trouble 
for a researcher or a research institute can only be taken from this actor’s self- 
defined identity, an actor may still misperceive relevant events. The factual 
magnitude of a problem and its magnitude as perceived by the actor con-
cerned can differ significantly, so that an actor may be in trouble without 
knowing about it, or may at least be in bigger trouble than he thinks, or, 
conversely, may exaggerate his trouble. Whenever an analytical observer can 
plausibly argue that a research actor has misperceived his trouble, we have 
to take this into account. In such a case, one of the interesting questions is 
why an actor has misperceived his trouble, and for how long.
Finally, an actor’s trouble may be very idiosyncratic -  for example, if 
an individual scientist does not succeed in mobilizing a particular project 
grant he desperately needs to realize some research goal. Such fates will not 
concern us here. We shall concentrate on trouble that affects at least a consid-
erable number of individual researchers, even though it may not affect all of 
them with the same intensity.
Coping refers to each reaction of researchers or research institutes aimed 
at reducing existing trouble. Thus understood, coping is distinguished, on the
5 Compare, for instance, Haan (1977) or Lazarus/ Folkman (1984).
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one hand, from prevention. Prevention is only possible when the trouble has 
not happened yet, but has been anticipated by the actor; if he is actually able 
to avert the trouble, there is no need to cope. Often, however, the trouble is 
not foreseeable for the actors concerned, so that they can hardly intervene 
in advance. On the other hand, coping is distinguished from leaving oneself 
to one’s fate, a response often accompanied by despair. This happens when 
an actor perceives that his scope of action is so limited that he can do nothing 
about his trouble. Such fatalistic suffering, which can be equated with letting 
the trouble happen, does not mean that the actor concerned stops acting alto-
gether. But it does mean that he makes no move to change his way of acting 
intentionally with the aim of reducing his trouble. Although he experiences 
trouble, he acts as if there was no trouble. An example might be a researcher 
who writes one application for a project grant after another, is repeatedly 
rejected by the funding agency, but never tries to improve his chances by 
switching to another funding agency, modifying the form of his applications, 
or choosing a new research topic. Of course, an actor’s attempts to overcome 
trouble may be unsuccessful, yielding, in the end, the same result as inactivity 
would have. But the intentions are clearly different in these two cases.
As long as an actor who endures his trouble has a definite hope that it 
may be eliminated or at least reduced in the future by someone else’s action, 
his suffering is, in effect, waiting for better times. For example, a powerless 
actor who knows that some powerful actors are affected by the same trouble 
as he is, and who expects that they will cope with it successfully and, as a 
side-effect, will also free him from it, may assume that his suffering will not 
last long.
If trouble is understood as a growing discrepancy between an actor’s 
actual situation and his aspiration level, there are two possible directions 
coping can take. An actor may either try to adapt his aspiration level to his 
changed situation, or he may try to change his situation so that it fits again 
with his unchanged aspiration level. An example for the first alternative of 
defensive coping might be a professor who comes to terms with his growing 
teaching load, which has forced him to neglect his research interests, by alter-
ing his professional self-identity. Rather than thinking of himself primarily 
as a researcher, he would now think of himself primarily as a teacher. On 
the surface, defensive coping is sometimes difficult to distinguish from a 
fatalistic suffering of trouble. Fortunately, this is not our problem here be-
cause we are interested in the second alternative: active coping, i.e. an actor’s
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attempt to adapt the situation to his aspiration level. Examples of this would 
be a research institute trying to get very involved in contract research in order 
to compensate for a shrinking financial resource base from institutional grants, 
or an individual researcher from this institute who is strongly devoted to basic 
research leaving the institute when it shifts over to applied contract research.
It is not only the kind of trouble an actor faces that determines whether 
he will choose an active or a passive coping strategy and which specific steps 
he will take: Two additional factors are important. First of all, the trouble-
some situation itself consists of opportunity structures which shape the actor’s 
room to maneuver -  for example, rights to participate in relevant decision-
making bodies, the availability of alternative sources for financial resources, 
or competitive relations with other actors. Secondly, the respective individual 
or corporate actor’s identity, made up of his resources of social influence (e.g. 
power, money, prestige) and his abilities (e.g. his inventiveness) determines 
his capacity for strategic action. With regard to corporate actors, the degree 
to which they are capable of making collective decisions that are binding for 
their individual members is especially relevant.
Concerning active coping, two subtypes can be distinguished according 
to the goal of the coping activities. Active coping may, on the one hand, be 
an attempt to eliminate trouble. If this is successful, active coping will have 
had the same result as prevention would have had -  with a time lag. For 
instance, research institutes may protest against resource cutbacks, mobilize 
allies, and thereby pressure the political actors causing the trouble to change 
their minds. On the other hand, active coping may merely be an attempt to 
adapt to trouble: the trouble itself is taken for granted, and the actors facing 
it only try to make the best out of a bad situation. The research institute de-
scribed above, which decides to compensate for the loss of institutional grants 
by turning to contract research, exemplifies this strategy.
This clarification of our two main variables corresponds closely with 
psychological or social-psychological theories of personal coping. As we turn 
to our major analytical focus, the differences in our approach will become 
evident. Psychological or social-psychological theories of personal coping 
focus on a single actor struggling with his trouble. They try to work out a 
systematic and comprehensive classification of the different kinds of coping 
and to analyze which kind of coping an actor chooses in response to the kind 
of trouble he is faced with, his opportunity structure, and his capacity for
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strategic action.6 Sometimes these theories examine the consequences the 
specific coping reaction chosen by an actor has for him. Psychological and 
social-psychological studies, however, analyze individual coping reactions 
isolated from each other. For instance, a person with a chronic illness some-
how manages his life -  but usually in a social context of relevant others who 
do not share this kind of trouble. Often this analytical perspective is adequate. 
But there are other situations where a plurality of actors interacting with each 
other share the same trouble. Then, a new phenomenon arises which tends 
to be neglected by psychological and social-psychological studies because 
their point of reference is an individual’s psychological condition: the social 
interference o f different actors’ coping reactions.
To illustrate this type of interference, we can take the example of a small 
company town in which many people have lost their jobs. Here, it would be 
worthwhile to look not only at how each affected worker deals with this 
“critical life event” individually, but also at the aggregate effects of the sum 
of the individuals’ coping efforts, which are directed not only at solving the 
same problem, but at overcoming common trouble.7 One of the most interest-
ing research questions might then be how the individual coping efforts of the 
plurality of actors mutually reinforce or weaken each other. It would also be 
important to find out whether the individual actors perceive these interferences 
and, if they do, whether this provokes them to coordinate their coping in order 
to increase its effectiveness. If many of the unemployed persons react by 
accepting very low wages from all kinds of employers in the region, the 
aggregate outcome of this might be a ruinous competition among those seek-
ing employment. But if the unemployed become aware of this hazard and are 
able to organize themselves in order to prevent such competition, they might, 
in the end, attain a collective bargaining power which would be advantageous 
for each one of them.
This very simplified example demonstrates what we are primarily interest-
ed in: the aggregate effects o f the interconnected coping efforts o f  a plurality
6 An excellent example is Erving Goffman’s study of how stigmatized persons try to 
manage their “spoiled identity” (Goffman 1963).
7 In their classical empirical study of the unemployed workers of Marienthal (a small town 
in Austria) conducted during the Great Depression in the late 1920s, Marie Jahoda, Paul 
Lazarsfeld and Hans Zeisel combined both analytical concerns (Jahoda/ Lazarsfeld/ Zeisel 
1933).
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o f researchers and research institutes affected by common trouble. From a 
growing number of studies investigating the reciprocal causal connections 
between individual actions and their combined structural effects, we are aware
Q
that the nature of aggregate effects is often very complex. Assuming a sim-
ple additive cumulation of single actors’ coping efforts is, in most cases, 
clearly inadequate. To give just one example, consider the situation of re-
searchers competing for project grants that are becoming increasingly scarce. 
One sensible way the researcher can cope with this kind of trouble is to try 
to gain a competitive advantage by investing more effort into carefully rea-
soned grant applications. But if everybody does this, the aggregate effect is 
definitely not an increase of everybody’s chances, but a collectively self- 
defeating increase in the standards for grant applications. Consequently, for 
a proper understanding of many empirical phenomena we have to search for 
theoretically more complex patterns of aggregation.
From this point of view of the respective constellation o f actors as a 
whole, we are also able to evaluate more thoroughly a single actor’s chances 
of succeeding with his coping efforts. His relative success or failure, more-
over, is theoretically not attributed to his respective actions, but to how these 
particular actions match, within the given pattern of aggregation, with the 
actions of the other actors involved.
This declaration of our research interest shall now be specified into a set 
of interrelated theoretical concepts. These theoretical concepts are deliberately 
not designed to apply only to situations of trouble. They can also be used for 
the analysis of trouble-free situations, be they situations offering good oppor-
tunities to researchers or research institutes, or be they situations classified 
as “business as usual.” In our view, it seems to be advantageous to have one 
single framework for the analysis of all kinds of relationships between scien-
tific research and politics, instead of designing specific frameworks for specif-
ic kinds of relationships. This does not exclude the possibility that the general 
framework can be enriched by certain specific concepts which apply only to 
one kind of relationship -  for instance, to a troublesome relationship. We 
certainly aspire to do this, but we will not go very far in this direction right 
here because we are convinced -  as will become clear from our research 8
8 The stimulating studies by Raymond Boudon or Thomas Schelling (Boudon 1978; Schel- 
ling 1978) illustrate this point.
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approach sketched below -  that such concepts have to emerge primarily from 
carefully studied empirical cases like the ones compiled in this book.
We begin constructing our layout of an analytical framework by distin-
guishing two potential sources o f  political trouble: firstly, political actors 
pursuing a given kind of research policy with troublesome consequences for 
particular research actors and, secondly, political actors in other policy areas 
whose actions have troublesome side effects on a given research actor’s re-
search conditions. Research policies are not only formulated and executed 
by the ministry responsible for research, but also by other ministries responsi-
ble for economic affairs, defense, or the health care system. The trouble 
caused by such policies may be intended or unintended. Policies with side 
effects on research conditions may be educational policies, especially with 
respect to research conditions at universities, which are often strongly influ-
enced by the teaching load of professors and their assistants, or budgetary 
policies which may restrict the financial resources available for the promotion 
of research.
Different levels of actors within the research system may be affected by 
political trouble. The first level is that of the individual researchers. The 
second is that of the informal or formal groups made up of individual re-
searchers. Informal groups of researchers may become quite large, as exempli-
fied by national or international scientific communities in well-circumscribed 
fields of research, sometimes referred to as “invisible colleges.” At some 
point, such originally informal groups usually organize themselves formally 
as scientific associations or sections of them. The most common case of a 
formal group, on the other hand, is a project team within a research organiza-
tion. Not all kinds of informal or formal groups can be properly characterized 
as actors. A group can only be called an actor if it is able, either by a major-
ity rule or by compliance with its leader, to make group decisions each mem-
ber is bound to comply with. A third level of actors consists of subunits of 
research institutes, such as departments of a university or divisions of a na-
tional laboratory. Again, these organizational units are only actors with respect 
to the issues they attack with a common will. A functioning formal hierarchy 
within these organizational research units will ensure that their categorization 
as actors is valid because their formal leader is entitled to determine the com-
mon will. The same holds true with respect to the fourth level of action: re-
search institutes as formal organizations. Finally, there may be a fifth level: 
groups of research institutes. In Germany, an example of such a group is the
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Max Planck Society, which consists of about sixty institutes. These groups 
of formal organizations work essentially like groups of individuals: They can 
be -  but are not necessarily -  actors.
The different levels of actors potentially affected by political trouble are 
often nested. Individual researchers are often members of informal or formal 
groups of researchers; these, in turn, are usually parts of organizational sub-
units of research institutes. These subunits are parts of research institutes 
which may, in turn, belong to a group of research institutes. But although the 
different levels of actors frequently fit nicely into one another like Russian 
dolls, there are not always common interests among them. Neither are the 
interests on a higher level necessarily determined by the interests at the lower 
level, nor vice versa. Accordingly, a situation that means trouble for actors 
on one level may not mean trouble for actors on another level, although the 
first level is contained within the other. For instance, the closing of a research 
institute as a formal organization can mean big trouble for its researchers, 
too, because they lose their research opportunities, not to mention their jobs. 
But it may be that there are plenty of other excellent institutes where they 
can continue their work. In this case, the trouble exists only on the higher 
level. Conversely, if the state agency financing a research institute refuses 
to allow the institute to give permanent positions to researchers, this may 
certainly mean trouble for the researchers, especially if job opportunities in 
the their research field are scarce. But the institute may find this policy bene-
ficial because it allows for some flexibility in dealing with personnel.
Sometimes, even when actors on different levels are affected in the same 
way by particular political interventions, the reactions on the different levels 
nevertheless run counter to each other. For instance, a research institute may 
be faced with political actors threatening to close it down if it does not step 
up its technology transfer to industry very soon. This certainly may mean 
trouble for the research fellows of this institute who are interested in basic 
research. But when the institute as an organization reacts by putting increasing 
demands on the researchers to engage in transfer activities, the best of them 
(who will have the best chances of receiving interesting job offers) might 
leave. This individual coping effort could impair the institute’s coping effort, 
which may vitally depend on the capabilities of these very researchers.
In addition, there can be mild or extreme differences of interests -  includ-
ing different intensities of the same interest -  between actors on the same 
level. For example, an institute’s researchers oriented toward basic research
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will be affected quite differently from those oriented toward applied research 
when political actors call for an increase, say, in the institute’s share of con-
tract research for industry. While this could be major trouble for the first type 
of researcher, it may well be a good opportunity for the second type to im-
prove his standing within the institute. Another example could be the different 
consequences which increasing scarcity of federal funding might have on the 
different kinds of member institutes of the Max Planck Society. If, for in-
stance, the spending cuts apply mainly to the purchase of expensive research 
equipment, the natural-science institutes would have much more trouble than 
the institutes in the humanities.
All in all, a single political intervention may mean very different things 
to different actors within the research system, be they on the same level or 
on different levels of action. Some may see trouble looming, while others 
are unconcerned, and still others may see a good opportunity opening up. 
Those faced with trouble may be affected in the same way, or in different 
ways. This is the context within which coping occurs as a complex interplay 
between political actors causing trouble and research actors affected by that 
trouble. Actions causing trouble may produce coping efforts as reactions; in 
turn, those who caused the trouble may react to the coping, which may bring 
about new or intensified trouble, thus causing further coping, and so on. For 
instance, politicians demanding a new orientation of certain research areas 
according to political priorities not shared by the researchers may provoke 
evasive reactions: the researchers will pretend to comply with the political 
demands while secretly continuing to do their own thing as they see fit. When 
the politicians detect this, they may implement new devices for monitoring 
research, so that they cannot be deceived again. This may put an end to the 
evasive tactics the researchers had been using, but it will probably cause, 
depending on the individual circumstances of researchers, a new series of 
adaptive reactions. Some researchers may leave the respective institutes and 
look for new positions where they can better realize their own research ambi-
tions; others may, from that moment, perform their research without any 
enthusiasm or creativity. Again, the last kind of reaction, which is perceived 
as work-to-rule by the politicians, may motivate the latter to install additional 
mechanisms to enforce an adequate level of research output -  which may 
elicit yet another round of reactions by the researchers, and so on.
Such sequences of trouble and coping efforts, which can sometimes go 
on for quite a long time, have certain effects on the research conditions. As
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stated above, we consider these effects to be complex aggregations of action 
which is embedded within an institutional context. Because the research con-
ditions are the result of an interplay of many individual, collective and corpo-
rate actors on several levels of action, they cannot be traced back to any 
single actor and his intentions and capabilities. Although this holds true for 
almost all results of human action when it is triggered and shaped by interde-
pendencies between actors,9 there are many constellations of actors which 
are structured so simply that their aggregate effects are evident to any interest-
ed observer. Two features of an actor constellation -  the degree of compatibil-
ity between the intentions of the actors, and variation in the amount of social 
influence they possess -  largely determine its complexity and, hence, the 
extent to which its aggregate effects are obscured.10
The higher the compatibility of intentions among different interdependent 
actors, the more all these intentions can be realized simultaneously without 
friction. The scale of degrees of compatibility can, for reasons of simplicity, 
be divided into two opposites. On the one hand, there are several possible 
relations of compatibility between intentions: Different actors’ intentions can 
be identical without being competitive, their intentions can be complementary, 
or their intentions can be indifferent to each other so that none interferes with 
the other. In these cases, the aggregate effect of the actors’ combined actions 
is comparatively simple, because the actors are headed, more or less, in the 
same direction. On the other hand, however, there are at least two possible 
relationships of incompatibility between intentions: The intentions of different 
actors can be competitive, or they can be antagonistic. In these cases, the 
aggregate effects often become much more puzzling because the actors are 
headed in opposite directions and there is no easily conceivable point where 
their intentions might meet -  especially if there are three or more actors in-
volved.
9 As James Coleman puts it, social interdependencies result from a “simple structural fact”: 
“Actors are not fully in control of the activities that can satisfy their interests, but find 
some of those activities partially or wholly under the control of other actors” (Coleman 
1990: 29).
10 The following builds upon general ideas developed in Norbert Elias’ studies of “social 
figurations,” which were applied to the topic of unintended results of action by Reinhard 
Wippler (Wippler 1978: 158-161, 174-175).
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But even a high incompatibility of intentions can be overcome quite sim-
ply if there is a strong social dominance of one actor or a subgroup of actors 
with compatible intentions. The greater the difference in social influence is 
between the actors within the respective constellation, the less relevant the 
intentions of the other actors become for the aggregate effect. The intentions 
of the actors without significant social influence are socially neutralized. But 
the smaller the differences of social influence among the involved actors are, 
the more puzzling the aggregate effect of their combined actions becomes 
if the incompatibility of intentions is high.
Applying these general considerations to the constellations of political 
actors causing trouble and actors within the research system coping with this 
trouble, we can assume, first of all, that there is a high incompatibility of 
interests between the political actors and the researchers and research insti-
tutes. The extent of the compatibility of interests among the actors affected 
by the political interventions interests us more, however; as shown above, 
there are several combinations possible. There may be a high compatibility 
of interests among these actors, so that they stand united against the political 
actors. Or their interests may be highly incompatible: Some actors are faced 
with trouble, while others perceive this very “trouble” (especially if it affects 
their competitors) as presenting good opportunities for themselves. Or there 
may be an incompatibility of interests, with all actors seeing trouble, but each 
in different ways.
Turning to the differences of social influence, we find that political actors 
have the capacity to influence the actors within the research system signifi-
cantly, not just by incentives, but also by directives. There may be a clear 
social dominance of the political actors -  in this case, they will have their 
way. Or, the political actors may need the cooperation of at least some actors 
within the research system in order to effectively implement their interven-
tions. If this is the case, political actors might make use of the incompatibility 
of interests among the actors within the research system by playing off those 
who see good opportunities for themselves against those who see trouble. If 
all the relevant actors within the research system are faced with trouble, but 
each is faced with a different kind, the political actors can also make conces-
sions to some, thereby winning them for an alliance against the others.11
11 These concessions are a kind of “side-payment” (Scharpf 1991: 20-23).
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Such a policy of “divide and conquer” can even work if all relevant actors 
within the research system are faced with the same kind of trouble.
The extent to which the political actors predominate will determine how 
foreseeable the structural effects of their interventions will be, no matter how 
great or small the compatibility of interests among the relevant actors within 
the research system is. The effects will be those the political actors desire
-  or, at least, accept -  and, consequently, those that are not desired by the 
actors within the research system who are facing trouble from the political 
interventions. The latter’s efforts at active coping will be futile. There is 
nothing left for them to do but to bite the bullet and come to terms with the 
politically induced circumstances. But the more dependent the political actors 
are on the cooperation of actors within the research system, the more ambig-
uous this tableau becomes. Now, the structural effects will depend on several 
factors: whose cooperation the political actors will try to win, who will offer 
cooperation for what price, and what kinds of social influence can be accumu-
lated in this way. These factors -  and the choices of action shaped by them
-  may all be contingent to some extent; consequently, there may be no clear, 
stable, predictable outcomes; the outcomes will always be partially accidental. 
The questions raised by these considerations can only be answered by turning 
to specific cases and analyzing them carefully.
3 Research Approach
Perhaps the best brief characterization of the research approach we are trying 
to realize with this book is a combination of two well-known sociological 
slogans. What we are searching for is a “grounded theory of the middle 
range.”
Robert K. Merton distinguished “theories of the middle range” from grand 
theories providing “... a complete vade mecum to the solution of sociological 
problems” (Merton 1949: 165-166). This first element of our approach formu-
lates the goal we want to reach, signalling, on the one hand, theoretical mod-
esty. We want to emphasize explicitly that we are definitely not trying to 
work out an entirely new, all-encompassing theoretical perspective for all 
kinds of social studies of science, but a set of theoretical propositions about 
some specified aspects of a limited area of social phenomena. On the other
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hand, stating that we are searching for elements of a theory of our particular 
subject indicates that we are not satisfied with descriptions and explanations 
of singular historical episodes. We want to go beyond a mere compilation 
of cases, however well analyzed they may be. By providing a more abstract 
reflection about the cases and then comparing them, we wish to find general 
patterns of analytical relationships between trouble, coping strategies, constel-
lations of actors, and effects of coping with trouble on the research conditions.
The formulation of our research goal connotes the course we will take 
to achieve it: the “grounded theory” approach, as developed by Barney Glaser 
and Anselm Strauss (Glaser/ Strauss 1968; Strauss/ Corbin 1990), who made 
a clear distinction between their approach and others tending toward purely 
deductive theorizing or purely inductive empiricism. Purely deductive theoriz-
ing supposes that a complete and sufficiently detailed theory exists that can 
be used to examine the class of phenomena at hand, so that the subset of 
phenomena to be empirically analyzed just has to be subsumed under this 
theory. In this case, there is essentially nothing to be learned from social 
reality because everything is already included in the existing theory. Such 
an approach would undoubtedly fail to answer our research questions because 
there is no comprehensive theory which applies to our phenomena. Purely 
inductive empiricism, conversely, supposes that there is a tabula rasa regard-
ing the phenomena at hand, waiting to be filled with theoretical concepts and 
propositions. Such an approach is often as unrealistic as the purely deductive 
approach: This is certainly true in the case of our research questions. As we 
have documented here, we have some theoretical ideas about what to look 
for. These ideas are often still vague, and sometimes there are contradictory 
suppositions -  but not only would it be impossible to pretend we could forget 
about the already existing knowledge, it would be foolish indeed not to use 
it as a starting point for our investigation. This is the major message of the 
“grounded theory” approach: In such a situation of incomplete and insecure 
theoretical knowledge, one should go back and forth between theory construc-
tion and empirical investigation again and again, until the theory consolidates. 
How often these two steps have to be taken cannot be stated a priori -  the 
moment to stop has come if further empirical work does not reveal any new 
surprises.12
12 Buhler-Niederberger (1985) elaborates this point very clearly.
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Our selection of cases to be discussed at the conference was guided by 
this approach. Each of the contributions dealt with a particular empirical case 
illustrating a typical pattern of politically induced trouble and coping strate-
gies within the research system. Of course, each case we have selected exhib-
its only a fraction of the aspects we have sketched. Moreover, we could not 
hope to offset this deficit fully with our particular selection of cases. With 
such a small number of cases it is impossible to portray the whole variety 
of possible constellations of trouble and coping efforts. While trying to reflect 
the diversity of trouble in research to a certain extent, we had to bear in mind 
that too much diversity would make it difficult to compare the cases. The 
diversity results from different national contexts (France, Germany, Great 
Britain, and the United States), different kinds of research institutions (univer-
sities, Big Science centers, other state-financed research institutes), different 
kinds of political trouble (financial cutbacks, redirection of research programs, 
institutional change, political regulation), different degrees of success and 
different effects of the coping efforts.
Let us briefly introduce the case studies. The first two, by Schimank and 
Braun, deal with resource trouble in the university sector. While Schimank 
can show that the high degree of autonomy professors enjoy at German uni-
versities makes collective coping efforts rather improbable, and that individual 
researchers must thus resort to adaptive strategies, Braun explains in his com-
parison of biomedical research in Great Britain and the United States how 
political trouble is filtered by funding agencies and medical schools before 
it reaches the individual researcher. Both cases deal explicitly with a multi-
level actor constellation.
That prevention of trouble is not only a theoretical idea but also, under 
certain circumstances, a real possibility is stressed by the two French case 
studies presented by Krauss and by Musselin and Vilkas. Each case shows 
that in the extrauniversity research sector in France there is a high potential 
for successful conflict avoidance and for bargaining between the elites of the 
research system and the political system. Krauss points, in addition, to the 
possibility of “mock trouble” staged sometimes when political actors perceive 
a need to demonstrate activism.
An example of extreme political trouble is examined at two levels in the 
cases presented by Mayntz and Wolf, who analyze the dissolution of the East 
German extrauniversity research system as a consequence of the unification 
of Germany. Looking at trouble at the highest level, Mayntz shows that the
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East German Academy of Sciences failed to survive as a corporate actor 
because of misperceptions, a lack of social influence and allies, internal con-
flicts, and permanent pressure from a changing political environment. Wolf 
describes how particularistic coping methods enabled certain institutes, re-
search groups and individual researchers within the Academy of Sciences to 
be partly successful in finding a new role in the unified German research 
landscape when the Academy disappeared as a corporate actor. Stucke’s case 
study also involves the effects of German unification on the research system 
-  in the West. Analyzing how the German National Research Centers have 
dealt with the most severe cutbacks in their history, he concentrates especially 
on how the interplay of coping at four levels of actors affects the respective 
coping strategies.
The next two case studies concern trouble as a consequence of political 
regulation. Hasse and Gill argue that in the case of genetic engineering in 
Germany, regulative trouble was not only triggered but also continually rein-
forced by public distrust toward the biotechnological research community and 
by an erosion of support from industrial users of research results. The coping 
activities divided the scientific community -  and often even individual insti-
tutes -  into opposing factions of “hardliners” and “moderates,” who mutually 
weakened each other’s efforts. Analyzing the decisions to build new research 
reactors in Berlin and Munich, Gläser et al. also illustrate the relevance of 
intrascientific dissent, which, in their case, made it relatively easy for political 
actors to drag out the licensing procedure or even refuse to license the reac-
tors. Moreover, Gläser et al. stress the extremely limited coping repertoire 
available to research actors faced with regulative trouble.
Weyer’s case study of strategic action and actor network dynamics in 
space policy concludes the empirical section of this book. He shows that even 
successful coping may engender new trouble in the future, and that coping 
and trouble must be analyzed not only with respect to specific focal actors, 
but also by considering the whole social network in which the actors are 
embedded.
We take a final, comparative look at the empirical material in our con-
cluding theoretical examination of the cases. Here, we further clarify each 
case analytically and group the cases according to similar patterns in order 
to derive theoretical generalizations which can be divided into two categories. 
Firstly, we expect to find conceptual generalizations which allow us to clas-
sify the analytical dimensions “trouble” and “coping.” While these conceptual
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generalizations will be descriptive, we also hope to find, secondly, causal 
generalizations: propositions about general patterns of coping with trouble 
and its effects on research conditions. These generalizations will be explana-
tory.
Most of the contributions of this reader were originally presented at a 
conference entitled “Coping with Trouble” which we organized at the Max-
Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung in Cologne in November 1992. We 
gratefully acknowledge that the conference was financed and hosted by our 
institute. Most of the chapters based on a conference paper profited greatly 
from the lively, inspiring discussions at the conference. Thus, we editors and 
most of the authors are heavily indebted to the discussants: Erhard Friedberg 
(Centre nationale de la recherche scientifique, Paris), Dorothea Jansen (Uni-
versität Bochum), Wilhelm Krull (Wissenschaftsrat, Cologne), Werner Meske 
(Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozialforschung, Berlin), Arie Rip (Universiteit 
Twente), Peter Weingart (Universität Bielefeld), Tom Whiston (Science Policy 
Research Unit, Brighton), David Wilsford (Georgia Institute of Technology, 
Atlanta), Hans-Willy Hohn and Fritz Scharpf (Max-Planck-Institut für Gesell-
schaftsforschung, Cologne).
Last but not least, we would like to thank Cynthia Lehmann, who did a 
great job of copy-editing and correcting English phrases that could sometimes 
be quite mysterious. With her personal mixture of enthusiasm and patience, 
she kept us out of a lot of potential trouble.
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